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"DUE

PROCESS OF LAW."

THE only point necessarily decided in the great case of
Ogden v. Saunders,12 Wheaton, 213-369, was, that a debtor's
discharge under the insolvent laws of one State, is not a valid
defence to an action brought in the Federal Courts by
a creditor who is a-citizen of another State, and has not voluntarily made himself a party to the insolvency proceedings:
Mzy v. Sith, 3 Peters, 411; although the contract in suit
was made and to be performed in the debtor's State after the
insolvent laws were passed and while they were in force:
Baldwin v. H7ale, 1 Wall. 223; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Id. 409.
The chief object of this article is to state and briefly explain
a principle which, it is believed, will reconcile the conflicting
decisions of the Federal Courts on the one hand, and the State
Courts on the other hand, respecting the rights of non-resident
creditors; or, more accurately, to state a principle which
seems to reconcile the reasoning of the State Courts with the
decisions of the Federal Courts on this question, in which contrary decisions have been rendered.
An attempt will be made to show, in the light of subsequent and analogous decisions, that the true ground of the
Federal decisions is, not that prior insolvent laws impair the
obligation of contracts of non-resident creditors, but that such
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laws as applied to such creditors are unconstitutional, because

they deprive such persons of their property "without due
process of law," in violation of the 14th Amendment to
the National Constitution; namely, by judicial proceedings
in a court of insolvency without legal notice of those proceedings.
The decree of discharge is therefore void for
want of jurisdiction, as against such creditors.
The reasoning of the State Courts in which decisions conflicting with those of the Federal Courts have been made,
proceeds on the ground that prior State insolvent laws do not
impair the obligation of contracts, if the contract was made
and to be performed within the State where such laws exist
at the time of the contract's making, although the creditor
be a citizen of another State: Scribner v. Fisher, 2 Gray, 43;
Parkbson v. Scoville, 19 Wend. 150.
It is believed that this reasoning is sound, but that the
decisions are erroneous on the ground of due process of law.
Insolvency proceedings, like every other kind of judicial
proceedings, require legal notice to be given to every party
whose rights may be injuriously affected. But the laws of a
State have no extra-territorial operation except by comity,
and therefore a State cannot constitutiofially and effectively
send its process for imparting notice beyond its own limits,
so as to compel a non-resident to appear in the insolvency
proceedings, and to be bound by them.
This is substantially the reasoning of the Federal Supreme
Court in Boldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233-234; and Gilman
v. Lockwood, 4 Id. 409, 411, which were cases involving
insolvent laws, but in which the ground of being contrary to
due process of law was not expressly mentioned. In Gilman
v. Lockwood, supra, Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, who delivered the
unanimous opinion of the Court, used this language: "Insolvent laws of one State cannot discharge the contracts of
citizens of other States; because such laws have no extraterritorial operation, and consequently the tribunal sitting
under them, unless in cases where a citizen of such other
State voluntarily becomes a party to the proceedings, has no
jurisdiction of the case (page 411), citing Baldwin v. Hale,
sqn'a,,and Balwbin v. Bank of Nhewbunry, 1 Wall. 334.
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In Baldwin v. Hale, supra, the Court said, on page 233:
"Insolvent systems of every kind partake of the character of
Parties whose rights are to be
a judicial investigation.
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified. Common justice
requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without notice and an opportunity to make his
defence." Crit g, -Nationsv. Johnson, 24 How. 203; Boswell's
Lessee v. Otis, 9 Id. 850; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comst. 514.
And on page 234, the Court also stated that "insolvent laws
of one State cannot discharge the contracts of citizens of other
States, because they have no extra-territorial operation, and
consequently the tribunal sitting under them, unless in cases
where a citizen of such other State voluntarily becomes a
party to the proceeding, has no jurisdiction in the case. Legal
notice cannot be given, and consequently there can be no obligation to appear, and of course there can be no legal default."
Again in the recent ease of Sloane v. Chiniquy, U. S. Circ.
Ct. Dist. Minn. July 3, 1884, 22 Fed. Rep. 213, 215, Mr.
Justice MILLER used this language: "n\o State insolvent law,
as has been repeatedly decided, can discharge or release the
debtor from his obligation to pay, under that contract, where
the creditor is a citizen of another State; because the law
cannot operate upon a citizen not within its jurisdiction.
The theory of that is, that the judgment of a Court discharging a debtor from his obligations is, as to the creditor residing in another State, an ex parte judgment; but if he comes
within the State and submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the Court, it has never been held that the contract may not
be discharged."
An examination of these cases will show that these quotations embody the true ground of the decisions. They do
not contain one word about impairing the obligation of contracts, and they all express the idea that the insolvent laws of
one State are unconstitutional and void as against non-resident
creditors, on the single ground that they purport to allow a
valid judgment of discharge of contracts to be rendered against
the claims of non-resident creditors, who have received no
"legal notice" of the insolvency proceedings. Although the
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insolvency court had jurisdiction of the general subject of insolvency and of the person of the debtor, yet as it had not
jurisdiction of the person of the non-resident creditor, the
discharge was not valid as against such creditor (Pratt v.
Chase, 44 N. Y. 597, 599-600) because the debt follows the
person of the creditor: .Bedell v. Seruton, 54 Vt. 493, 494;
Neewton v. Hagerman, U. S. Circ. Ct. Dist. Nevada, Nov. 26,
1884, 22 Fed. Rep. 524,527. (See, also, State Tax on -Foreign-HeldBonds, 15 Wallace, 300, 320-326.)
This course of reasoning brings the principle underlying
these insolvency cases of non-resident creditors directly within the principle of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.714; Harkness
v. Hyde, 98 Id. 476; St. Glair v. Cox, 106 Id. 350; Freeman
v. Alderson, 119 Id. 185. These were cases of State statutes
purporting to allow valid judgments in personam to be rendered against non-residents by publication of notice, or some
other mode of substituted service of process short of personal
service within the State, or a voluntary general appearance in
the action. It was held that such notice was not "legal notice," and that the statutes were unconstitutional, and the
judgments rendered by the State Courts in accordance with
them were void, on the sole ground that they were contrary
to due process of law, and violated the 14th Amendment to
the National Constitution, which ordains that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. It would be but a repetition of the reasoning
above employed, with respect to the insolvency cases, to state
the reasoning of Pen oyer v. Ne.ff and other cases, and but a
single extract will be made.
In Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 188, Mr. Justice
FIELD, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said:
"The laws of the State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as may be allowed by comity; its tribunals cannot send their citations beyond its limits and require
parties there domiciled to respond to proceedings against
them, and publication of ci'ation within the State cannot
create any greater obligation upon them to appear." (See,
also, Pennoyer v. .Neff, 95 U. S.714, 727.)
All these cases show clearly that the constitutional question
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involved is one exclusively of legal notice of judicial proceedings, and if the non-resident have not legal notice of
those proceedings he is not bound by them, because the State
statute is contrary to "due process of law," and the judgment or decree rendered in accordance with the statute is
void for want of jurisdiction, as an unconstitutional statute
cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court: -Ex pare Siebold,
100 U. S. 371, 376, 377; Ex parte Jackson, 96 Id. 727; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113.
This view is also supported by the qualification engrafted
upon the doctrine itself, namely, that a non-resident creditor
who voluntarily becomes a party to the insolvency proceedings,
without objecting to the granting of the discharge, thereby
waives his extra-territorial immunity, and cures the unconstitutionality of the insolvent laws, and is therefore bound by
the discharge. This point was decided in Clay v. Smith, 3
Peters, 411, in Journeay v. Gardner, 11 Gush. (Mass.) 355,
357, and in Blackman v. Green, 24 Vt. 17, 21.
This qualification is precisely "on all fours" with the wellsettled rule that a non-resident defendant in an ordinary action in personam, who has been served merely by publication
according to the local statute, and who enters a voluntary
general appearance without objecting to the want of "legal
notice,'- thereby waives his extra-territorial immunity, and
cures the unconstitutionality of the local statute, and is there-

fore bound by the judgment: Pennoyer v. Eeff, 95 U. S.
714.
The analogy becomes still more apparent when we consider
another aspect of the two cases. In the insolvency cases it
seems to be settled that where the non-resident creditor appears in the insolvency proceedings and objects to the granting
of the discharge, he does not thereby waive any of his rights
and is not bound by the discharge: Norton v. Cook, 9 Conn.
314; McCarty v. Gibson, 5 Gratt. (Va.) 307; Collins v. Bodolph, 3 Green (Iowa), 299; Phillips v. Allan, 8 B. & C. 477.
So, in the case of an ordinary action in personam against a
non-resident, served only by publication, if he enters a special
appearance and objects to the illegality of notice, he does not
thereby waive any of his rights, and is not bound by the
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judgment, although he answers to the merits after his objection is overruled: llarkness v. -Hyde,98 U. S. 476 ; Walling
v. Beers, 120 Mass. 548.
Both cases seem to stand upon the same ground, namely,
that the State Courts have no jurisdiction over the persons of
non-residents, and the State Legislatures cannot legitimately
confler that jurisdiction. The debt follows the person of the
vreditor, and it can neither be taxed nor discharged by any
state of which the creditor is a non-resident: State nhx on
1reiyn-lleld -Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 320-326 ; Bedell v. Scrulon,
54 Vt. 493, 494; A-ewton v. Jiagermann, U. S. Circ. Ct. Dist.
Nevada, Nov. 26, 1884, 22 Fed. Rep. 525, 527; Von Glahn
v. Varrenne, 1 Dillon, 515, 519.
If it be objected to this view that the Supreme Court did
not place the decisions in the insolvency cases upon the ground
of due process of law, the answer is that those cases were all
decided before the 14th Amendment was adopted, and therefore the Court could not -2o so. That the Court would do so

now seems to follow from the whole tenor of Pnoyerv. Kh¥.,
95 U. S. 714, in which it took advantage of the first opportunity, after the adoption of the 14th Amendment, to declare
that any attempt on the part of State Legislatures to encroach
upon the rights of non-residents by judicial proceedings in
personam, founded upon substituted service of process, was
contrary to due process of law and unconstitutional.
Before the 14th Amendment, the question seems to
have been one, not properly of constitutional law, but of private international law, of comity, as pointed out by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 3llarshv. Patnai,
3 Gray, 551, 557, 562, and by other Courts (see, also,
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 ; Iay v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15,
36 ; Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, 168-169 ; Canada So. By.
Co. v. Gebhard, 109 Id. 527); and, therefore, the decisions
of the Federal Supreme Court were not conclusive upon the
State Courts. Consequently a writ of error would not have
lain from the Federal Supreme Court to a Court of the State
granting the discharge before the 14th Amendment.
It seems worthy of notice, as perhaps reconciling the apparently conflicting decisions of the Federal and State Courts
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upon this much vexed question of insolvent law, that no case
decided by the Federal Supreme Court was carried up from a
State Court, in which State the discharge had been obtained.
In Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 ; Suydam v. Broadvax, 14 Peters, 67 ; Baldwin v. Bale, 1 Wall. 223 ; Baldwin
v. Bank of Newbury, Id. 234; Gilman v. Lockwood, 4 Id.
409, the actions were all carried up from the Federal Courts,
and it seems that these decisions rest solely on principles of
international law.
That the question before the 14th Amendment was
one of international comity, seems to follow from the recent
case of Canada Southern By. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527.
In this case, it appeared that Gebhard was a citizen of New
York and purchased certain bonds of the railway company,
which was a corporation organized under the laws of Canada,
and that subsequently the Parliament of Canada enacted a
"scheme of arrangement," the effect of which was to postpone the time of payment of the coupons and to lessen the
rate of interest. This scheme was assented to by a majority
of the bondholders, but Gebhard did not assent to it, and
brought his action to recover upon his bonds in the State
Court of New York, from which the railway company
removed it to the Circuit Court of the United States. The
defence was this "scheme of arrangement ;" but the Circuit
Court decided in favor of Gebbard, on three grounds: (1)
that this legislation of Canada impaired the obligation of
contracts ; (2) that it deprived the bondholder of his property
without due process of law, and (3) that comity did not require the Courts of the United States to give effect to such
unjust foreign legislation as against our own citizens: Gebhard
v. Canada Southern By. Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. S. Dist. N. Y.
Jan. 24, 1880, 1 Fed. Rep. 387. On a writ of error, however, the National Supreme Court reversed this judgment of
the Circuit Court, and held that the c6ntract was not impaired, nor was Gebbard deprived of his property without
due process of law by such legislation ; and that "the true
spirit of international comity requires that schemes of this
character, legalized at home, should be recognized in other
countries:" per Mr. Chief Justice WAITE, page 539.
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The Court, comparing such legislation with bankrupt laws,
said: "The confirmation and legalization of a ' scheme of
arrangement' under such circumstances, is no more than is
done in bankruptcy, when a ' composition' agreement with
the bankrupt debtor, if assented to by the required majority
of creditors, is made binding on the non-assenting minority :"
page 536.
It is obvious that this decision rests solely upon "the true
spirit of international comity," and not upon any principle
of constitutional law. The opinion seems to proceed upon
the ground of a waiver of constitutional rights by a purchase
of bonds of a foreign corporation. Thus the Court says:
"Every person who deals with a foreign corporation, impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign government, affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation
with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known and estab*
lie is conH
lished policy of that government authorizes.
clusively presumed to have contracted with a view to such
laws of that government :" pp. 537-538. Vallee v. Dumerque,
4 Exch. 290; Austrahtsia Bk. v. Harding,9 C. B. 661 ; Copin
v. Adamson, L. R. 9 Ex. 345.
II.
"OBLIGATION

OF CONTRACTS."

That impairing the obligation of contracts is not the true
ground of these decisions, is further evinced by the late case
of Hlall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, in which the Court placed
the decision squarely upon the principles of international
law. "This Court decided, in D'Arey v. Ktchum, 11 1ow.
165," said the Court in Hall v. Lanning, at page 169, "that,
by internationallaw, a judgment rendered in one State, assuming to bind the person of a citizen of another, was void within
the foreign State, if the defendant had not been served with
process, or voluntarily made defence, because neither the legislative jurisdiction nor that of the courts of justice had bind-.
ing force."
In the later case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.714, the language and reasoning of the Court are still more explicit. On
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page 722 the Court says: "The other principle of public law
referred to, follows from the one already mentioned; that is,
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory. * * * No
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that
territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions." And again on page 727: "Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and summon
parties there domiciled, to leave its territory and respond to
proceedings against them."
Even when the Federal Courts are held within the same
State which rendered the judgment affecting the non-resident,
they are not conclusively bound by the State judgment, because they are tribunals of a different sovereignty, exercising a
distinct and independent jurisdiction, and are bound to give to
the judgments of the State Court only the same faith and credit
which the Courts of another State are bound to give to them.:
Id. pp. 732-733. (See, also, Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 328,
340.) That is, the judgment may be shown by parol evidence
to be void, on the ground that the Court had not jurisdiction
of the cause, or of the res, or of the person of the defendant:
.Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Thompson v. Whitman, 18
Wall. 457. Even when the record shows that the Court had
jurisdiction; as that service of process was made on the defendant, this may be contradicted by parol and the judgment
invalidated, in the Courts of another State, or in the Federal
Courts: Knowles v. Gaslight Co., 19 Wall. 58; Thompson v.
Whitman, 18 Id. 457; Pennoyer v..Nef, 95 U. S. 715 ; D'Arcy
v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165; Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 328,
340; 31ackay v. Gordon, 34 New Jersey, 286.
In Thompson v. Whitrnan, supra, this doctrine was for the
first time applied to judgments in rem, and it was held unanimously, that the statement of sufficient facts in the record to
confer jurisdiction upon the State Court, might be contradicted by parol, and the judgment thereby invalidated in a
Federal Court. And in the later case of Pennoyer v. Ye/f, 95
U. S. 714, this doctrine was still further extended to judgments quasi in rein; that is, proceedings against the person in
form, but in substance against property; as where property
VOL. XXXVI.-80
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is brought under the control of the Court by seizure or some
equivalent act at the commencement of the proceedings, but
where no service is made upon the defendant, nor a voluntary
appearance entered by or for him.
In this case of Pennoyer v. NLeff, the decision is placed upon
the constitutional ground that a State statute, purporting to
allow a valid judgment in personam to be rendered against
a non-resident without personal or voluntary appearance, is
unconstitutional and void since the 14th Amendment,
because it is contrary to due process of law. And it was
further held, that since the same Amendment, such a judgment
was void, not merely voidable, and could be impeached collaterally, not only in the Courts of other States and in the Federal Courts, but also in the Courts of the same State, and was
reviewable in the National Supreme Court. On pages 732733 of the opinion of the Court, it clearly appears that this
last result of making the State Courts' decision reviewable in
the National Supreme Court, was first accomplished by the
14th Amendment, and was not possible before the adoption of that Amendment, because no Federal question was involved, and the National Court had no jurisdiction. In other
words, by the provision, that "no State * * * shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law," this whole subject of State judgments affecting non-residents was changed from a mere question of
international law or comity, to review which the National
Court had no power, to a most important question of constitutional law, to review which that Court has now plenary
power.
An analogous course of reasoning seems to lead to a like
result respecting discharges in insolvency, as against non-resident creditors; namely, that before the 14th Amendment, a discharge in insolvency granted by a State Court, was,
when pleaded in the Courts of other States, a mere question
of international law or comity (May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15;
D'Arey v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165) over which the National
Court had no jurisdiction; but that, since the adoption of
that Amendment, the question is changed into one of consti-
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tutional law, over which the National Court has now full
jurisdiction.
It is believed that there is only one case contrary to this
view, that of Shaw v. Robbins, 12 Wheat. 369, note, which
was evidently decided without much consideration. All the
other cases upon this point in the National Court were carried up from the Federal Courts and not from the State
Courts. Shaw v. Robbins seems to be overruled by Canada
So. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, in which the decision
is placed exclusively upon the ground of international comity.
If this case had been carried up from a State Court instead
of from a Federal Court, the National Supreme Court would
have had no jurisdiction. This last statement assumes that
the decision of the State Court would have been the same as
that of the Circuit Court, namely, in favor of the creditor's
claim that the statute impaired the obligation of his contract
and deprived him of his property without due process of law.
Many Courts and judges have criticized adversely the doctrine of Ogden v. Saunders, that prospective State insolvent
laws impair the obligation of posterior contracts made and to
be performed within the State, when the creditor happens to
be a citizen of another State, but do not impair the obligation of such contracts when the creditor happens to be a citizen of the same State. Some of these cases are Cook v. .lhoffat,
5 Howard, 309; Marsh v. Putnam, 3 Gray, 551; -Donnelly v.
Corbett, 3 Selden (N. Y.), 500, 505-506; Felch v. Bugbee, 48
Maine, 9, 17; Towne v. Smith, 1 Wood. & M. 115, 130-134.
The doctrine itself, when stated in this bald form, seems
utterly contradictory if not absurd. It seems difficult, if not
impossible, to understand how the mere fact of difference in
citizenship can impair the obligation of contracts. In -Donnelly v. Corbett, 3 Selden, 500, the Court repudiated the doctrine that prior State insolvent laws impair the obligation of
contracts, which, by their terms, were to be performed within
the State as against non-resident creditors; and placed the decision upon the ground that the laws of one State have no
extra-territorial operation and could not legitimately operate
injuriously upon the rights of citizens of other States.
In Poe v. Duck, 5 Md. 1, the Court put a similar decision
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upon the ground of notice, stating that the insolvency courts
of Maryland had no power to decide "upon the rights of persons without giving them a sufficient opportunity of being
heard:" pp. 8-9.
If the non-resident creditor had written into the contract a
clause or condition to the effect that the debt might be discharged at any time upon a full surrender and distribution
of the debtor's present possessions, ratably among all the
creditors, without a payment in full or any claim upon the
debtor's future acquisitions of property, it seems perfectly
clear that, if the debtor complied with these terms, the debt
would be discharged without impairing the obligation of the
contract. This clause or condition forms an essential part of
the obligation of the contract and, therefore, cannot impair it.
The only remaining question is, therefore, whether or not
a non-resident, who voluntarily makes a contract in the
debtor's State to be performed therein, does not ratify and
adopt and make a part of his contract the fair and ordinary
insolvent laws of that State, just as much as if he had written
them into the contract.
This is the very reason always assigned for the first branch
of the rule in Ogden v. Saunders relating to contracts between
citizens of the same State, and, on principle, it seems that the
same reason should hold good for the second branch of that
rule relating to contracts between citizens of different States,
which are made and to be performed within the State granting the discharge.
As a general proposition it is settled conclusively that the
laws subsisting in a State, when and where a contract is made
and is to be performed, enter into and form a part of the obligation of the contract just as if they had been expressly
referred to and incorporated in the contract by the parties.
"This principle embraces alike those [laws] which affect its
validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement:" per Mr.
Justice SwAYzE in Von Hfoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 550;
citing Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton, 92; McCracken v. HUayward, 2 Howard, 612; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Id. 319; People
v. Bond, 10 Cal. 570; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 231.
The two cases of Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 Howard, 311, and
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Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627, illustrate very clearly
this general proposition. These cases both turned on the
identical statute, that of Illinois, allowing to a mortgagor
twelve months to redeem, after a sale under a decree of foreclosure, and to his judgment creditor three months after that
period. The latter case arose on a contract made after the
statute was passed; the former on a contract made before it
was passed. It was held that in the latter case this law
entered into and became a part of the contract, and, therefore,
did not impair its obligation and was valid; while in the
former case that the law did not enter into and become a part
of the contract, and was, therefore, void, because it impaired
the obligation of the contract.
This rule applies even to the State laws relating merely to
the remedy as shown by the above cases. (See, also, Edwards
v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; Seibert v. Lewis, 122 Id. 284.) Now,
does the fact that the creditor is a citizen of another State
from that of the debtor, in which latter State the contract
was made and to be performed, change or reverse the legal
effect and meaning of the contract, or take the case out of
the general rule?
In all, except insolvency cases, it seems to be settled that
it does not. In addition to the authorities cited above, see
Jifay v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15, 3--41; Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns.
233; Hicks v. HotchLiss, 7 Johns. Ch. 297, KENT, Chan.;
Very v. McHty, 16 Shep. (Me.) 206.
In .May v. Breed, supra, the contract was made in England,
while the English Bankruptcy Act was in force, and was also
to be performed therein by its terms. The creditor was a
citizen of Massachusetts, and the debtor was a citizen of England, and obtained his discharge under the English Act. It
was held that said Act entered into and formed apart of such
contract, and was by comity the law governing the contract,
wheresoever suit was brought, and hence did not impair its
obligation.
Every contract is necessarily governed by the laws of some
State or country, and, in the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, it is a "principle of universal law * * * that in every
form, a contract is governed by the law with a view to which
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it was made: IT'aynan v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 48 ; Lamar
v. Jllico,, 114 U. S. 218, 220.
In the absence of any thing in the contract to indicate by
what law the parties intended the contract to be governed,
the Court must determine from all the facts of the case "to
what general law it is just to presume that they have submitted themselves in the matter :" per Mr. Justice WILLES
in Lloyd v. Guibert, 6 B. & S. 100, 1.30; s. o. L. R. 12 B.
115, 120. A striking illustration of this rule is found in the
case of Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353, 362, where the Court
says: "Americans and Englishmen entering into a charter
party of an English ship for ail ocean voyage, must be presumed to look to the general maritine law of the two countries,
and not to the local law of the State in which the contract is
signed." It was accordingly held that the contract was
governed by the maritime law, which was different from that
of Louisiana, where the contract was signed, although the
suit was brought in the United States Circuit Court sitting
in Louisiana. (See, also, Pritchardv. Norton, 106 U. S. 124;
The Gaetano, 7 L. R. P. D. 137.)
From these cases, it appears that though neither the place
of making nor the place of performance of a contract is conclusive in deciding what law is to govern the contract, yet
that these are leading facts to be considered in connection
with the other facts of the case, including the difference of
citizenship. When the place of making is also the place of
performance, the presumption is very strong that the parties
contracted with a view to the law of that place and meant
their contract to be governed by the law of that place, especially where the debtor is a citizen of that State or country,
although thi creditor is not.
It is evident that the same contract cannot be governed by
two different sets of laws. When A. and B., citizens of
different States, make a contract which contains no express
language indicating that the parties intend their contract to
be governed by the laws of some third State or country, the
contract will be governed either by the laws of A.'s State or
by the laws of B.'s State (Paine v. ?. ?. Co., 118 U. S. 152,
161), because that is the most just and reasonable rule to
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adopt; and it will not be governed by the laws of any other
State or country, unless the place of performance is in such
other State or country: Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 853,862 ;
Pritchardv. Norton, 106 Id. 124; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Peters,
635.
When the creditor voluntarily makes his contract in the
debtor's State and expressly agrees to its performance there,
is the contract to be governed by the laws of the creditor's
State or by the laws of the debtor's State? It is simply a
question of whether the creditor or the debtor shall be favored,
as both cannot be, and which law the parties may justly be
presumed to have had in view when they made the contract.
Under all the circumstances of the case the debtor seems to
have the stronger claims to favor, and the laws of his State
relevant to contracts should be deemed the laws which the
parties had in view. He has done no act tending to mislead
the creditor, and he has the right to rely upon the protection
afforded him by the laws of his State, and also, perhaps, the
right to presume that the creditor knew the laws of his (the
debtor's) State, at least upon such a well-known subject as
ordinary insolvent laws: May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15, 88-41;
Blanchardv. Bussell, 13 Miss. 1, 4.
CoNcLusIoN.-The views herein maintained seem to reconcile many, if not most, of the apparently conflicting decisions.
They free the rule relating to posterior contracts made under
State laws, from the anomalous qualification that, if the creditor be a non-resident, the State insolvent laws (and those
only), do not enter into and form part of the contract, and
do, therefore, impair the contract's obligation; while if the
creditor be a resident or citizen of the debtor's State, they do
enter into and form part of the contract, and therefore do not
impair the contract's obligation.
It is believed that the true explanation of this anomalous
qualification may be found in the recognition of the principle
that it is contrary to natural justice to deprive a non-resident
creditor of his property by insolvency proceedings without
legal notice of those proceedings, and where, consequently,
the insolvency court has no jurisdiction to discharge the debt,

